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Are there distinctions at the neurophysiological level that correlate with voluntary
and involuntary actions? Whereas the wide variety of involuntary behaviors (and
here mostly the deviant or pathological ones will be considered) will necessarily be
represented at some biophysical level in nervous system activity–for after all those
cellular activity patterns manifest themselves as behaviors and thus there will be a
multiplicity of them–there could be some general tendencies to be discerned amongst that
assortment. Collecting observations derived from neurophysiological activity associated
with several pathological conditions characterized by presenting will-less actions such
as Parkinson’s disease, seizures, alien hand syndrome and tics, it is proposed that a
general neurophysiologic tendency of brain activity that correlates with involuntary actions
is higher than normal synchrony in specific brain cell networks, depending upon the
behavior in question. Wilful, considered normal behavior, depends on precise coordination
of the collective activity in cell ensembles that may be lost, or diminished, when there
are tendencies toward more than normal or aberrant synchronization of cellular activity.
Hence, rapid fluctuations in synchrony is associated with normal actions and cognition
while less variability in brain recordings particularly with regards to synchronization could
be a signature of unconscious and deviant behaviors in general.
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dynamics
INTRODUCTION
The main query to be addressed here is whether there are spe-
cial patterns of activity in the nervous system, particularly in
the brain, that are associated with wilful and will-less behav-
iors. Based on what is known regarding the correlation of certain
neurophysiological activity patterns with pathological or deviant
behaviors, it is tempting to conclude that there seems to be
a clear tendency in brain collective dynamics that result, or
manifest themselves, as will-less actions. This article explores evi-
dence that long-lasting widespread synchronization in specific
brain networks results in behavioral deviations including will-less
actions.
The underlying general principles could be relatively simple
in spite of mechanistically complicated processes. However, as
is common in scientific endeavors, a dichotomy is lurking here,
the dualistic vision of intention and behavior, one of the oldest
and most debated dualisms in the history of science: mind ver-
sus brain. Nevertheless, it is feasible to transcend that duality, to
set aside the dichotomy (which in the end could be beneficial to
neuroscience, as centuries of discussion on the mind-body “prob-
lem” has not resulted in any apparent satisfactory solution). Thus,
questions about the causal role of intentions on behavior acquire a
different perspective from which improved unbiased answers can
be obtained.
Take a look for instance at the following enquiry into a well-
known relation between a brain specific activity and behaviors:
as found out many decades ago, the µ rhythm, an oscillation
of 8–12Hz recorded mostly from central sensory-motor cortical
areas, tends to diminish or disappear when the subject exe-
cutes, visualizes, or thinks about executing movements (motor
imagery). This rhythm was thus associated with intentional
actions and it has been recently shown to correlate with inten-
tional social coordination as well (Naeem et al., 2012). One can
then ask, in a dichotomy-minded setting, whether the change in
this specific activity pattern, the µ oscillation representing a col-
lective activity in millions of brain cells, is causing the behavior,
or whether it is the behavior that brings about the temporary
demise of this brain rhythm. However, this question loses, or
perhaps acquires a different meaning, if both the neurophysio-
logical activity (the µ rhythm) and the behavior are considered
aspects of the same phenomenon: the collective activity patterns
manifest themselves as actions, and actions in turn are those
coordinated patterns; the only difference consists of the tissues
involved. In overt actions muscles and bones take part, indeed
extending the collective coordinated activity to a multi-system
level including the nervous and the skeletal systems. This style
of thought has the flavor of a loop that may not be welcome
by some, but loops are omnipresent in biology, and cogni-
tion in particular (Hofstadter, 1979). This non-dualistic frame
of mind is beneficial for a better comprehension of the topic
addressed here and the remarks that will follow in subsequent
sections.
The central argument is that widespread long-lasting syn-
chronous activity amongst brain regions disrupts the transient
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coordination for optimal, adaptive behavior. That a certain degree
of coordination amongst the activity of cell ensembles in the
nervous system is needed for proper behaviors (and information
processing in general) is well known from the invertebrates
(think of the cellular activity in a central pattern generator
that produces different oscillatory patterns that manifest as var-
ied movements of the animal depending on the relation of
those cellular firing patterns) to vertebrates; and that cell assem-
blies organize their activity through transient synchronization
has been proposed by many investigators (von der Malsburg,
1981; Varela et al., 2001; Singer, 2006; Kelso, 2008). The con-
sequences of altered interactions amongst brain oscillations are
multiple but in the final analysis it can be described using
synchrony measures (Schnitzler and Gross, 2005). The coordi-
nation dynamics of nervous systems is reflected in synchrony
patterns but in the case of higher brains (as opposed to older
structures such as central pattern generators) these patterns
are very transient and a certain degree of variability in syn-
chrony is expected for proper and adaptive cognition to develop.
More widespread and long-lasting synchrony may disrupt the
“healthy” coordination dynamics with the consequent appear-
ance of abnormal behaviors (Perez Velazquez and Frantseva,
2011). Thus, cellular hyperexcitability increases the tendency
toward long-lasting widespread synchronization in the brain
resulting in behavioral deviations including will-less actions, a
notion that has received experimental support at the molec-
ular/cellular level in a recent study. Using optogenetic tools,
Yizhar et al. (2011) altered the balance between excitation and
inhibition in mouse brains (specifically prefrontal areas) and
found that more excitation resulted in impairment of informa-
tion processing in general and in abnormal social behaviors (these
being social exploratory actions that mice perform), and these
behavioral alterations were concomitant with enhanced rhythmic
activity (a sign of increased synchrony). Restoring excitation-
inhibition by enhancing in these mice, restored the normal
behaviors.
Along the same lines, Yang et al. (2012), using in vitro organ-
otypic rat cortical slices, reported that an optimal level of syn-
chrony (here optimality defined as that which does not create
paroxysms, or neuronal avalanches as these are termed in the
paper) is associated with a narrow range of excitation-inhibition
ratio and furthermore it coincides with maximal variability in
synchrony, that the authors interpret as states being near critical-
ity, where the system can benefit frommoderate (“healthy”) levels
and maximal variability of synchrony.
Thus, these two recent studies provide more detailed mech-
anistic support for the notion that hyperexcitability enhances
the probability to widespread, less variable and long-lasting syn-
chrony that results in behavioral deviations and neurological
pathologies. If this were to be the case in general, the job for
clinicians in different specialties is to discover the areas in the
nervous system (does not have to be restricted to the central)
of more-than-normal activity and synchrony in each patient and
target those areas with specific interventions to reduce the pro-
nounced tendency of all nervous cells to synchronize activity. This
is obviously easier said than done, as a localized damagemay pro-
duce alterations of function in remote connected areas (think of
diaschisis for instance), but this could be a common framework
to understand most neural pathologies.
A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON “CONNECTIVITY”
Before proceeding, some preliminary, technical comments on the
notions of synchronization and connectivity are needed. Those
who follow the literature will have noticed the variety of distinct
results in “brain connectivity” analysis: task-related connectivity
studies yield different results from resting (no task), and some-
times even identical tasks or apparently same resting conditions
have resulted in an assortment of connectivity patterns. Why this
variability? In what follows the word “connectivity” or its close
relatives like “synchrony” shall appear several times, and while
most of neuroscientists know what these terms denote, best to
clarify a few points on these matters now at the start of this
narrative.
Firstly, some disorders such as schizophrenia or autism have
been classically labeled as syndromes of “dysconnectivity” at the
brain physiological level, categorization that originally stems from
anatomical and psychological findings mostly. However, it is a
different matter tomore directly assess or compute dynamic “con-
nectivity” amongst brain areas using synchrony or graph theory
analysis, to cite two common analytical methods widely used
these days. Thus, the apparent disconnection in schizophrenia
becomes a different type of connectivity when methods such as
graph theory are used, in that there is a shift in the schizophrenic
brain from local to more global connectivity (Rubinov et al., 2009;
van den Berg et al., 2012). Similar comments can be said about
autism studies, where rather than disconnection what emerges is a
different pattern of synchronization (Perez Velazquez et al., 2009;
Teitelbaum et al., 2012).
The second consideration is the fact that enhanced connectiv-
ity between two brain areas is observed from physiological signals
such as the electroencephalogram or functional neuroimaging
data, does not necessarily mean that those areas are more syn-
chronized in their activities. In fact, it does not even imply a
stronger real connectivity, because most of the connectivity anal-
yses performed these days evaluate correlations in activity, and
if two areas display correlated activity then the assumption is
made they are “strongly connected,” but this may or may not
be the case. Correlations in activity between two systems (brain
regions) can be due to several phenomena and not necessarily via
direct mutual interactions (they could be driven by a third source
for instance). These topics have been discussed previously (Perez
Velazquez and Frantseva, 2011) and this is not the time to delve
on these matters, suffice to mention that changes in connectiv-
ity will be taken, in this work, just as indicators of differences in
coordinated/correlated activity, and especially in synchronization.
Let us now proceed to consider some involuntary actions and
their associated neurophysiological activity patterns.
AUTOMATISMS DURING SEIZURES
Perhaps the most prominent characteristic examples of what
apparently are involuntary actions occur during seizures in epilep-
tic patients, automatisms that many times are well-coordinated
behaviors such as picking up objects. Notwithstanding the con-
troversy about the extent to which subjects lose consciousness
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during seizures (Gloor, 1986; Blumenfeld and Taylor, 2003), at
least during complex partial seizures, it is very probable that the
actions remain mostly involuntary during ictal events. The main
reason for this controversy is that the level of awareness during
seizures cannot be known because patients are not responsive
hence communication at the moment of the brain paroxysmal
event is not feasible. The answers obtained after the ictal event
indicate that patients are normally unaware of the actions dur-
ing seizures but this could be due to improper formation of the
memory trace (hence from the patient’s viewpoint the event never
existed) due to the altered brain activity characteristic of the ictus.
Nevertheless, if we assume that the actions are involuntary, then
the underlying neurophysics consists in the paroxysmal activ-
ity in extensive cell populations: prominent increase in cellular
excitability and synchronization.
The nature of these paroxysmal discharges, (the electrographic
seizures), can be encapsulated in two main aspects: higher than
normal excitability in nervous tissue leading to extended periods
of synchronization. Details about specific cellular and molecu-
lar aspects of epileptiform activity can be found in many texts
(Jefferys, 1990; McCormick and Contreras, 2001; Perez Velazquez
and Wennberg, 2004). For the present purposes, the important
matter is that the abnormal synchrony patterns during seizures
result in profound alterations of the coordinated activity of cere-
bral networks with the consequent impairment of information
processing, and thus, unawareness of the ictal automatisms could
possibly result.
At the root of the phenomenon then two tendencies are
found common to many pathologies: the tendency to increase
excitability as well as synchrony in specific brain regions. There
is wide empirical evidence for both of these phenomena, (hyper-
excitability and higher than normal synchronization), during
seizure activity (reviewed in chapter three of Perez Velazquez and
Frantseva, 2011). It should perhaps be noted here, for fairness’
sake, that there are a few studies reporting lower than normal
synchrony during seizures. Nevertheless, different results on syn-
chrony can be obtained if synchronization is evaluated between
collective activities of cellular ensembles (like local field potentials
representing mostly synaptic potentials), or between individual
spike firing in neurons so that desynchronization in the spike fir-
ing of individual neurons (this would be at short time scales, or
high frequencies) and synchronization at the slower time scale
(low frequencies) of bursting activity and synaptic inputs can
occur simultaneously. It is conceivable that there could be differ-
ences in coordinated activity at several levels so there is no reason
to despair at the apparently different and opposite reports that
appear in the literature, it all depends on the level of description
and methods used. What is apparent is that there are abnor-
mal patterns of synchronized activity associated with epileptiform
activity.
Hyperexcitability before and during the seizure is not as con-
troversial as the aforementioned studies on the degree of syn-
chrony. In fact, already three decades ago, Babb et al., using
chronically implanted microelectrodes into areas of the lim-
bic system in patients, determined individual spike firing (unit
activity) in neurons, and their results showed that there is a pop-
ulation of neurons that depolarize simultaneously and are more
prone to discharge synchronously, and that the number of these
neurons that increase the firing rates determine the severity and
extent of the seizure propagation. For example, they estimated
that about 7% of the recorded neurons increased the firing rates
during sub-clinical seizures (these are seizures that do not alter
consciousness and have no behavioral manifestations, thus the
term “sub-clinical”), whereas about 14% of neurons augmented
the firing rates during auras (specific sensations patients develop
just before the ictal event, even though there are those who
consider auras as part of the seizure), and 36% of neurons dur-
ing clinical seizures (Babb et al., 1987). Thus, this early study
demonstrates that seizure severity is accompanied by enhanced
cell firing. The observation of an increase in BOLD signal ∼5 s
prior to seizure onset (Bai et al., 2010) is a further indication
of greater excitability occurring before the synchronous activ-
ity becomes apparent in the recordings, and along the same
line it has been known for decades that high frequency activ-
ity is detected at the onset of ictal events (Fisher et al., 1992).
Nowadays, there seems to be a re-surge of this long-known
notion denoted by new expressions such as high frequency oscil-
lations (HFOs), upon which there is an abundant, ever-increasing
literature.
In summary, the most probable scenario, considering the
many studies on these topics, indicate an increased synchro-
nized activity during seizures that will involve distinct brain
structures and, depending on where this abnormal coordinated
activity occurs, different behaviors (automatisms) can be mani-
fested determined by the chains of brain cells involved. As well,
conditional on the extent and magnitude of this synchronization,
different degrees of paroxysms can be expected. For instance, one
unusual automatism in epileptic patients is to perform the sign
of the cross. Wennberg et al. (2009) reported the case story of
a patient who apparently was unconscious during seizures and
involuntarily made the signum crucis, an action that, interest-
ingly, the patient had performed voluntarily after the ictal events,
following her parents’ advice, early in her disease (seizures were
seen in the past as diabolical interventions). The fact that now
the action is involuntary suggests that the neural activity of her
seizures has integrated the neural networks (motor areas and
others) that were responsible for that specific and at early time
voluntary act, so now the action occurs during the ictus and
it remains out of consciousness. This intriguing case provides
food for thought as it reflects the integration of neurophysi-
cal and psychological levels and illustrates how brain ensembles
of cells “storing” certain actions can be recruited by paroxysms
or aberrant synchronous activity and yet may remain out of
mind because the abnormal coordination dynamics during these
events perturb the integration and segregation of information
characteristics of normal brain function.
PASSIVITY SYNDROMES
Perhaps related to the phenomenon of higher synchronous activ-
ity associated with involuntary actions, it has been known for
some time that dissociative states (multiple personality disor-
ders as they were called in past times) occur in patients with
“abnormal” temporal lobe EEG that is similar to temporal lobe
seizures. Mesulam (1981) describes seven of these patients with
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dissociative states and five others that experienced illusion of
external possession, and the EEG recordings of these individuals
presented paroxysmal events even though these were not always
correlated in time with the psychiatric episodes. Nevertheless,
these types of will-less behaviors were associated with abnormal
(higher than normal in those cases) brain synchronization.
Further evidence for more synchrony in brain activity dur-
ing involuntary actions comes from a study of schizophrenic
patients with passivity phenomena. Passivity delusions involve
the belief that the actions are influenced by external agents
and are perceived as involuntary to some extent. These patients
displayed hyperactivation of parietal and cingulate cortices
(areas fundamental for attention to and programming of motor
actions in space) that decreased over time in those patients
that showed improved (that is, diminished) passivity phenom-
ena. Hyperactivity in neurons greatly increases the probabil-
ity of “hypersynchrony,” as expounded in Perez Velazquez and
Frantseva (2011). Schizophrenics without passivity symptoms did
not display the hyperactivation seen in the other patients, nor
control subjects (Spence et al., 1997). In general, it could be
concluded from the current evidence that there could be a ten-
dency of the schizophrenic brain to display more synchronized
activity with less variability in the coordinated activity patterns.
What Lee et al. (2003) termed overbinding: abundance of ran-
dom connections such that distinguishing internal from external
inputs becomes problematic and thus hallucinatory phenomena
may appear.
DISINHIBITION SYNDROMES
Related to automatisms during periods of high synchronization,
the following examples of involuntary actions occurring not dur-
ing clinical seizures but nonetheless, are associated with paroxys-
mal activity and are reflections of the dis-coordination of brain
cell ensembles due to the hyperexcitability and hypersynchrony
commented above. Thus, another illustration of involuntary acts
is the rare neurological disorder known as alien hand syndrome.
Individuals suffering from this symptom claim that the actions
of, normally, one of their hands are controlled by other forces
that do not depend on them, thus the actions of those limbs can
be regarded as will-less. It could be argued that patients still per-
ceive/sense/feel the alien actions as being intentional and this is
why they think their limbs are controlled by other entities, for
in the final analysis will is, like everything else, a perception, as
Hume noted in his “Treatise of Human Nature” of 1739: “ . . . that
by the will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel
and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new
motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.” Still, there
is a grade of involuntariness in these patients’ actions and this is
not an all-or-none phenomenon.
While most studies about this syndrome have been neuropsy-
chological or clinical in terms of finding brain lesion sites, almost
nothing is known at the neurophysiological level. However, there
is a case report that found paroxysmal activity in discrete cor-
tical areas recorded with scalp EEG that correlated with alien
hand episodes (Brázdil et al., 2006). Another case report, using
functional MRI, found brain widespread activity when the move-
ments were voluntary but only localized, restricted activity in
the contralateral primary motor area (M1) during alien hand
episodes (Assal et al., 2007), therefore indicating that inten-
tionality requires the coordinated activity of widespread brain
networks. This notion finds support in the global workspace
theory, in that extensive broadcast of information throughout
many brain areas is required for attention and awareness in
general (Baars, 1988), and emphasizes the importance of the
proper coordinated activity amongst varied and extended brain
cell ensembles for purposeful behavior to occur. Distortions of
that coordination either by more (or less) than the necessary
synchronization will favor non-awareness and the emergence of
deviant behaviors.
Another example where actions are driven by external stim-
uli and inhibition seems lost is that of utilization behavior.
Individuals suffering from utilization behavior (and the related
imitation behavior originally described by Lhermitte in 1983
as having environmental dependency syndrome), have difficulty
resisting the impulse to operate or manipulate objects which
are in their visual field and within reach. Characteristics of this
syndrome include unintentional actions triggered by the immedi-
ate environment, and therefore could be considered examples of
involuntary actions that are similar to reflexes. The neuroanatomy
has been linked to lesions in the frontal lobe, and to our knowl-
edge nothing has been done so far in terms of brain coordinated
activity. Nevertheless, a possibly related study by van der Helden
et al. assessing brain coherence during observational learning
(that is, subjects had to imitate movements) found an enhanced
fronto-parietal coherence in these imitation tasks (van derHelden
et al., 2010). Whether this observation indicates that individuals
affected with environmental dependency syndromes displaymore
synchrony in their brains during the impulsive behaviors cannot
be assured at this point due to lack of studies, but that hypothesis
opens up an intriguing possibility.
INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS IN PARKINSON DISEASE
The motor dysfunctions present in Parkinson disease (PD), and
other deviations of motor coordination in Huntington’s dis-
ease and tardive dyskinesia, provide another illustration of how
changes in organized patterns of activity of the nervous system
lead to deviations of normal and adaptable function, specifically
to involuntary movements characterized in these cases by tremors
and other actions.
For the sake of brevity, let us state in simple terms that
the (main) molecular basis of this disorder is the degenera-
tion of the dopaminergic neurons of the substantia nigra, which
causes a dysfunction in the areas to where these cells project.
The resulting altered activity in these areas show a tendency to
synchronization: as dopaminergic transmission decreases, neu-
rons in the subtantia nigra become more excitable to cortical
inputs and there is an enhancement of synchronous activities in
the nigral and basal ganglia-cortical networks. This conclusion
stems from evidence obtained in rodent models of PD where the
dopaminergic fibers have been damaged, using 6-OHDA which
is toxic to dopaminergic cells. This revealed a tendency toward
hyperexcitability in the substantia nigra pars reticulata and the
consequent enhancement of rhythmic synchronization between
the basal ganglia and cortical networks after dopamine depletion,
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and, more specifically, the response of basal ganglia cells to cor-
tical inputs was found to be enhanced after the dopaminergic
lesion (Belluscio et al., 2007; Dejean et al., 2008). Evidence for
enhanced tendency to synchronized activities in a diversity of
cortical areas during pathological tremors has been obtained
too at the level of MEG or scalp EEG (Volkmann et al., 1996;
Tass et al., 1998). Indeed, the success of deep brain stimulation
(DBS) in halting Parkinsonian tremor is derived from its net
effect, which is an effective reduction of activity in key structures
thus reducing excitability and thereby opposing synchronizing
tendencies.
Interestingly, similar reduction in tremor occurs after lesions
of the subthalamic nucleus (subthalamotomy) which may seem
paradoxical on a cursory look, as the irreversible damage to
the subthalamic nucleus causes same effect as its high-frequency
stimulation in DBS, but the net effect in both cases is the
same: decreased excitability in connected regions particularly the
globus pallidus. Hence in the final analysis what is found is an
altered coordination dynamics in basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical
circuitries, resulting from hyperexcitability and enhanced syn-
chrony in restricted brain populations whose manifestations are
will-less actions specific to the nature of those nervous circuitries
involved.
TICS IN TOURETTE SYNDROME
Tourette syndrome provides further examples of involuntary
actions, known as tics. The syndrome is characterized by motor
and vocal tics, as well as psychiatric co-morbidities. Is there
evidence for a disrupted coordinated activity and particularly
higher synchronization between brain areas associated with tics?
A direct computation of brain synchrony patterns during tics in
this syndrome has been done in one study so far (to the author’s
knowledge), but some studies, mostly based on neuroimaging
data, have investigated the brain circuits whose activity correlate
with the generation of tics in Tourette’s syndrome. Thus, a vari-
ety of regions have been detected to become more, or less, active
during tics and in other various situations such as movement
execution (e.g., finger tapping) with the general finding that,
perhaps unsurprisingly, brain activity is organized differently in
the patients as compared with control participants (Biswal et al.,
1998; Bohlhalter et al., 2006; Church et al., 2009). In the study
where synchrony was more directly assessed, Serrien et al. esti-
mated coherence at the alpha band (8–12Hz) derived from EEG
scalp recordings and found enhanced coherence between pre-
frontal and mesial cortex and sensorimotor regions, but this was
estimated during the voluntary suppression of tics rather than
during the involuntary tics. The conclusion of the authors was
that frontomesial networks become overactive in patients (Serrien
et al., 2005). However, whether same elevation of coherence
occurs during tics remains to be addressed. Franzkowiak et al.
(2010) used event related synchronization and desynchronization
but these measures are not directly related to synchronization as
denoted in our work.
There are further indications, albeit somewhat indirect due
to the data used and the analyses performed, of increased syn-
chrony between specific brain regions. Using Granger causality
to assess what is normally labeled as directionality of coupling,
and derived from fMRI data, Tourette’s syndrome individu-
als exhibited stronger neural activity and interregional causality
than healthy subjects throughout portions of the motor path-
way, including the sensorimotor cortex, putamen, pallidum, and
substantia nigra, and the activations were stronger during spon-
taneous tics as opposed to “voluntary” tics (Wang et al., 2011).
Futhermore, this study reported decreased brain activity in the
patient group in some cortico-thalamic pathways that may exert
top-down control over motor actions.
As another suggestion of higher-than-normal synchronous
brain activity associated with this condition, enhanced “connec-
tivity” using independent component analysis of fMRI data was
found in some patients as compared to controls during per-
formance of tasks such as finger tapping (Werner et al., 2011).
In another fMRI study, the derived connectivity patterns dif-
fered between patients and age-matched controls. More specifi-
cally, patients displaying stronger local connections while weaker
distant fronto-parietal connections, thus indicating that some
“control networks” (at least in terms of executive functions) in
paediatric Tourette syndrome have immature and anomalous
patterns of functional connectivity (Church et al., 2009).
That there could be abnormally elevated excitability in some
neuronal networks in this syndrome has been believed for some
time. Specifically, the local cell populations in the striatum
become more active in patients thus resulting in disinhibition
of the thalamocortical circuits and the generation of tics. This
chain of neurophysiological events is due to the particular cell
types and connections in the complicated basal ganglia circuitries.
In this regard, only one study has recorded directly cell activ-
ity during tics, study that had to be performed in monkeys as
Tourette patients are not invasively studied (with implantation of
intracranial electrodes). This study found that tics in the monkeys
(induced by local disinhibition of the putamen using the GABAA
receptor antagonist bicuculline) were associated with brief bursts
of action potential firing in the putamen, and subsequently, acti-
vation of cortical areas were detected; however, the activity of the
basal ganglia areas (globus pallidus) traditionally thought to be
the precursors of the abnormal cortical activity appeared after tic-
related cortical activations (Bronfeld et al., 2011). Therefore, the
globus pallidus may not initiate tics (at least in these monkeys, of
course the situation can be different in patients or in other tics
unrelated to the syndrome), but still these studies furnish indi-
cations of local higher spiking activity through striatal-cortical
chains and increased synchrony associated with tics.
Tics and the previously addressed Parkinsonian movements
are to a large extent irrepressible actions, the main difference at
the cognitive level is that the former are accompanied by an urge
to perform the movement whereas in the later the actions occur
without urges. At the neurophysiological level, it can be conjec-
tured that the reason for that difference is due to the widespread
activation in case of tics that involve higher-order association
areas and thus the “cognitive” component appears as an urge in
the individual’s mind. Recall the aforementioned conclusion by
Serrien et al. (2005) that frontomesial networks become overac-
tive in Tourette’s patients, and the study in monkeys showing that
basal ganglia areas become active after tic-related cortical activ-
ity (Bronfeld et al., 2011). On the other hand, the Parkinsonian
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movements seem to materialize mostly from the synchronous
activities in basal ganglia, thalamic, and motor cortical regions.
The fewer higher-order association areas that are involved in an
action, the more likely the action will be/feel involuntary, which
is supported by the observations made in patients where direct
motor cortex stimulation causes actions but these remain out
of awareness (see comments in section “The Function of Brain
Coordinated Activity in Sensing Volition”).
ALTERED BRAIN COORDINATED DYNAMICS DURING
HYPNOSIS AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF DREAMS
To continue this brief route over the correlations between brain
dynamic patterns and apparent unintentional behaviors, hyp-
notic suggestions offer possible examples of involuntary actions,
perhaps similar in nature to those of the alien hand syndrome
aforementioned in the sense that the actions may feel intentional
to the hypnotized subject but yet, be outside of his/her will. It is
not easy to put together the results of the few studies that have
assessed coherence/connectivity during hypnotic states because
each used different experimental (behavioral) methods (and of
course analytical, but this is to be expected considering the mul-
titude of techniques to quantify synchronization) and focused
mostly on comparing high versus low susceptible/suggestible
individuals. If some commonality amongst the observations of
those studies can be emphasized, it is that of altered synchrony
brain patterns during hypnosis, with some studies reporting
increases and other decreases in synchrony depending on sub-
jects and location of sensors (Egner et al., 2005; Fingelkurts et al.,
2007; White et al., 2009; Terhune et al., 2011). Most of these
few reports focused on measuring frontal and parieto-frontal
coherence, and in some cases significant alterations were found
during hypnotic states which indicates that, similar to the case of
dreaming addressed below, altered fronto-parietal coordination is
associated with the performance of hypnotically suggested acts.
To close this section, perhaps a brief comment on the brain
activity patterns during dreams may be of relevance, specifically
comparing normal dreams, those with “actions” without much
will control, and lucid dreams, in which the actions are performed
with a higher degree of self-awareness and insight: the dreamer
is aware that he/she is dreaming and therefore can deliberately
influence the actions. Hence the question can be asked as to
what differences in brain dynamics there could be between lucid
and normal dreams. Could there be fewer fluctuations in coor-
dinated activity (that is, more constant widespread long-lasting
synchrony) in normal dreams as opposed to lucid ones? Not
much is known, but evidence indicates that in normal, will-less
dreams, the coordination between parietal and frontal cortices is
lost or at least less than in lucid dreaming. Specific analysis has
revealed more beta band activity in parietal cortical regions dur-
ing lucid compared with non-lucid dream (Holzinger et al., 2006)
and coherence amongst frontal sensors, derived from scalp EEG
recordings, was found to be higher in lucid dreams than in non-
lucid ones and similar to the coherence in waking states (Voss
et al., 2009).
Thus, while not much has been investigated yet, the picture
that emerges is that lucid dreaming maintains similar brain coor-
dination dynamics as waking states especially with involvement
of widespread distribution of activity/information along pari-
etal and frontal areas. This is not too surprising as these cortical
regions are thought to be fundamental in the performance of
executive functions and self-awareness. No studies so far have
addressed and compared the variability and fluctuations of the
brain coordination patterns during both types of dreams hence
nothing can be said, but the aforementioned evidence indicates
that the loss of particular coordination dynamics in frontal and
parietal regions is associated with non-lucid, will-less dreams.
THE FUNCTION OF BRAIN COORDINATED ACTIVITY IN
SENSING VOLITION
The direct investigation of the optimal patterns of organized
activity that produce deliberate actions is not a trivial matter
because experiments are difficult to perform. Ideally, direct stim-
ulation of selected brain areas and the subsequent determination
of the spread and coordination of the imposed activity are needed
to directly address these matters. In this regard, some studies
performed on a variety of patients with intracerebral electrodes
that were undergoing awake brain surgery are of relevance. The
results obtained with these individuals present evidence for the
importance of widespread activation of several brain regions in
voluntary actions. The main results of these studies revealed
specific cortical areas that process information related to the
intention to perform movements and the awareness of the motor
actions (reviewed in Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), and shed light
on what possible coordination of activity between cortical areas
are necessary for the experience of intentional movements (for
a review on brain networks involved in voluntary actions, see
Haggard, 2008).
Parietal lobe stimulation in these patients induced a will to
move but without actual action performance, and increasing the
stimulation intensity resulted in patients claiming they had pro-
duced a movement that was never done. This was probably the
effect of activating connected areas in addition to the parietal due
to higher intensity of stimulation. Thus, more widespread activa-
tionmay lead to erroneous perception (sense of volition/motions)
if the coordination (synchronization) between those local areas
that were stimulated and the connected regions is not optimal.
But, as there has not been any synchrony assessment in these
studies, this remains speculation.
On the other hand, frontal cortex stimulations (premotor
cortical areas) evoked actions but these were unconscious, as
patients denied (unless offered visual feedback) performing the
movements. Hence motor awareness seems to emerge from pre-
dictions made about the movements rather than from the sen-
sory feedback (propioception) caused by the movement itself.
These results underline the relation between the interaction (that
will be reflected in coordination of activity) in fronto-parietal
areas and the expression or feeling of volition. These two fun-
damental cortical regions are implicated in executive functions
and there is an extensive literature on this subject. The possi-
bility to change the stimulation intensity in this experimental
setting makes it possible to investigate how more brain areas
may become recruited in movement awareness/monitoring as
the stimuli delivered through the intracerebral electrodes become
larger.
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Alterations of brain waveforms are indicators as well of dif-
ferent coordination dynamics associated with these phenomena.
For instance, the observation that patients with posterior pari-
etal damage do not display normal readiness potentials (made
famous by Benjamin Libet but originally described by Kornhuber
and Deecke, 1965) prior to voluntary movements (or even during
observation of actions, Fontana et al., 2012) is another indication
of a lack of normal coordination that results in altered recorded
waveforms. Furthermore, there is neuroimaging evidence in veg-
etative andminimally conscious state patients that underscore the
association of widespread brain activation with the level of con-
sciousness (Schiff et al., 2005; Schiff, 2010). Combined together,
all these data obtained in these patients indicate several brain
areas that can be part of a network responsible for, or associated
with, the sense of agency. Interactions amongst parts of this net-
work could be scrutinized, as recently proposed by David (2012),
using dynamic causal modeling.
Please note that in spite of the emphasis that has been placed
here on the notion of the importance of widespread coordinated
activity associated with awareness and volition, I am not impli-
cating the need to be conscious/aware of decision-making for
actions to be “free” (Heisenberg, 2009), but rather to experi-
ence “free will.” The perception, or experience, of the freedom
of the will by individuals can be scientifically studied, unlike
the intrinsic concept of freedom which is more a subject for
philosophy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evidence here reviewed suggests that altered synchrony per-
turbs the transient coordination dynamics of brain cell ensem-
bles, such that automatisms or reflexes that are imprinted in the
circuitries may emerge and remain out of consciousness thereby
becoming involuntary. Still, what is in the transient synchrony
patterns that allow “will” to be sensed? These patterns are reflec-
tions of the coordinated widespread activity in various brain areas
needed for the integration and segregation of information associ-
ated with cognition. Sensory inputs are segregated and processed
by distinct brain modules (visual, auditory. . . ) and later have to
be integrated in association areas like frontal or parietal cortices.
Perhaps in one of those areas, (the prefrontal being a candi-
date), there exists a “sixth” sense that perceives not the external
sensorium but the internal brain activity, and in this sense con-
sciousness and related aspects like free will become perceptions,
as denoted above when discussing the alien hand syndrome. As E.
T. Rolls puts it: “. . . if a system were doing this type of processing
(thinking about its own thoughts), it would then be very plausible
that it should feel like something to be doing this” (Rolls, 1999).
It can be said that, at a high level of description, brains
operate with (cognitive) symbols, reflection, and manifestation
of the neurophysiological activity of the whole organ, which in
turn act on those neurophysical events (Figure 1). For these rea-
sons, clear-cut answers to the question of whether conscious
intention “causes” behavior are hard if not impossible to find.
It is customary to declare that intention “causes” brain activ-
ity that produces actions, and a common interpretation of
the famous Benjamin Libet’s experiments is that the brain has
already made a choice some milliseconds before “we” become
aware of that decision, as if there were different people inside a
brain. If these dichotomies are surmounted, the problem in the
interpretation of the Libet experiment is significantly reduced,
interpretation which was in fact already given by Libet him-
self: “unconscious cerebral processes precede a subjective sensory
experience” (Libet, 2006); this latter sensory experience is the


























FIGURE 1 | Emergent mind/body phenomena. Panel (A), simple scheme
illustrating that mind/body phenomena can be considered as emergent
properties of the whole system derived from the local physiologic
characteristics, fundamentally interactions amongst cells, as much as the
local molecular interactions in silicone oil give rise to the geometric
patterns of the well-known Bénard convection. These emergent patterns,
in turn, act on and modulate/constrain the interactions amongst the
system’s constituents (or, in the language of physics, the order parameter
feeds back on the control parameters). In the case of brains, the patterns
can be thought of as the symbols with which at a certain, cognitive level
the brain operates, these symbols being representations of some aspects
of the reality experienced by the organism that has a brain. As remarked
in the text, intentions being high-level cognitive events or “symbols,” can
be conceived to act as constraints of the dynamics. In panel (B), a
schematic summary of the main message in the text, or how the local
physiologic interactions can give rise to aberrant coordinated activity
depending in part on the synchronous activities in specific brain cell
ensembles that result in altered cognitive processes and behaviours.
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on what brain areas share those specific contents and this spread
of activity will determine whether or not they become con-
scious (the global workspace theory aforementioned). Indeed
many aspects of the willed and well-articulated movements do
not enter consciousness, as we are not aware of the precise
motion of specific muscles to achieve certain goal; only the
general course of action enters awareness and is described as
voluntary. The reason for this apparent dissociation of lack
of awareness of specific motor actions and the general, global
sense of will, could be that some activity is not broadcast to
widespread brain regions but remains restricted to local neigh-
borhoods (for example in primary motor cortex), while other
activity patterns (encoding/representing goals) reach certain asso-
ciation areas and enter consciousness/awareness. Evidence for the
importance of widespread activation of several brain regions in
voluntary actions was emphasized above.
These here proposed biophysical signatures of wilful actions
can be viewed from a higher-level, more abstract but equivalent
perspective using dynamic system frameworks, as for instance
in the work of Albantakis and Deco (2011), in that decision
or choice making is described in a state space with attractor
networks. After all, voluntary actions are not taken from an
infinite set, rather the whole state space, in this view, is not
fully searched but only a few states, attractors that represent
choices, are selected, which is a feature imposed, probably and
at the physiological level, by the modularity of the nervous sys-
tem (modularity in biological systems reduces the search of the
dynamic state space so those that are more adaptive and become
the preferred solutions, see Lorenz et al., 2011). Viewing cognitive
phenomena as dynamic structures, and invoking the principles
of self-organization and emergence, consciousness along with its
features can be seen as emergent properties of the nervous sys-
tem, as much as the geometric pattern in the Bénard convection
(Bergé et al., 1984) results from the properties of the oil and its
environment, schematized in Figure 1 (similar arguments have
been recently made by Coey et al., 2012). Within this frame-
work, intentions have been conceptualized as constraints in the
emergent coordination, rather than causal entities of behaviors,
thus transcending aspects of the mind/body “problem” (Juarrero,
1999; Kloos and van Orden, 2010) which, incidentally, it is my
opinion that this is not a problem but rather, an ill-posed ques-
tion. Some authors have proposed a complementary science of
brain, mind, body and behavior, and remarked the universal
and seemingly unavoidable tendency to dichotomize and the
troubles derived from it (Kelso, 2008). In a century character-
ized by the rise of complexity science, transcending dichotomies
should be easier than ever. For some scientists, like Wolfgang
Pauli (1955), “It would be most satisfactory of all if physics and
psyche could be seen as complementary aspects of the same real-
ity” (in a lecture given in 1948 at the Psychological Club of
Zurich).
POSTSCRIPT: ON RANDOMNESS AND DETERMINISM IN BEHAVIOR
The evidence reviewed, especially with regards to the empha-
sis placed on synchronization of cellular activity as determi-
nants of voluntary and will-less actions depending on the degree
and “quality” of the synchrony, may be considered as suggest-
ing a determinism in behavioral actions, as the spike firing
synchronization of a population of neurons imposes a certain
forcing on the activity of the connected cells (synchronous arrival
of synaptic inputs on a neuron increases its firing probability), the
next stage in the chain that transmits the neural signals as action
potentials. Is there room for randomness, or indeterminacy, in
behavior or is this “forcing” from cell network to cell network
making all actions purely deterministic? This is a matter that can
be discussed at great length and thus not appropriate here, per-
haps only to declare my agreement with the words pronounced
by the mathematician Kurt Gödel that, to me at least, seem to
nearly put an end to further discussion on this topic of determin-
ism versus “free” will: “there is no contradiction between free will
and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows
oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not delib-
erately do the opposite of what one wants” (in Rucker, 1995). As
well, paraphrasing Einstein when he talked about space and time,
it can be said that order and randomness are modes by which we
think and not conditions in which we live. Behavior and brain
function can be described as stochastic, because of the unfeasi-
bility to know all factors, mental or environmental, involved in
producing actions. However, randomness implies a more intrin-
sic indeterminacy independent on the observer, and much can be
debated about this topic.
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